

“Authorized to Wash Clean the Brains”


Agencies Behind the “Re-education” Camps

contact@uyghurrightsmonitor.org

Executive Summary

The close examination of the mechanisms behind the “re-education” camps reveals that the mass detention campaign was a region-wide systematic set of policies that took place in close coordination between the CPC, XPCC, the People’s Government, and private and state-owned enterprises. CPC Xinjiang was primarily responsible for the decision-making processes behind the “re-education” camps by controlling top-level agencies such as the Xinjiang Political and Legal Affairs Commission and directing local-level party secretaries to coordinate between different departments. The CPC used the Xinjiang People’s Government and its Justice Department to legitimize and legalize the re-education camps through the amendment of new laws and regulations. Subdivisions such as the Health Commission and Education Bureau, among others, of the XPCC and the People’s Government supported the on-ground operations of “re-education” camps. Private and state-owned enterprises also played a direct role in monitoring the local people, and their detainment in the camps and/or forcefully transferring them to manufacturing bases.

Select Party and State Agencies Behind the “Re-education” Camps



Key Agencies Behind the Camps

[Xinjiang Political and Legal Affairs Commission](#) (PLAC) is the key body [behind the decision-making and implementation](#) of mass detention policies, which also issued the operational manual for the “re-education” camps. The PLCA operates an [Integrated Joint Operation Platform](#) (IJOP) – through which [officials communicate](#), and millions of investigations are assigned for [local follow-up](#) – and controls a body called [Counterterrorism and Stability and Maintenance Command](#) (CSMC).[1] The CSMC directs grassroots organizations such as [village-level party organizations](#), [resident work teams](#), and [village police offices](#) to [monitor, investigate, and collect information](#) about individuals by regularly paying family visits, calling people for interrogation, and strict surveillance of their daily activities.

Wang Mingshan, who is the former director and communist party secretary of [Xinjiang Public Security Bureau](#), and currently a member of the CPC Xinjiang Standing Committee, Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and President of XUAR Law Society is one of the main figures during the mass detention and establishment of “re-education” camps. On August 5, 2022, he published an [article](#) in Xinjiang Legal News emphasizing the still relevant and increasing importance of CSMC in the Uyghur region for “long-term stability” and “cracking down on extremist crimes.” The discourse has not changed much from the statements of Zhu Hailun – former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission – amid the peak of mass detention who strongly [promoted](#) the role of CSMC in March 2017, calling for “politicizing and educating the masses” through “cadres who go down to the grassroots.” In another [article](#) published in March 2017, Zhu Hailun further asserted to “make full use of the favorable opportunity of the special campaign to crack down masses... to squeeze out ... cancer-like thoughts such as religious extremism and sabotage activities.” Wang and Zhu were among top-level officials who played a significant role in planning and implementing the mass detention campaign. Both Wang and Zhu are among ten officials whom the United States [sanctioned](#) under the Global Magnitsky Act.

The CPC Xinjiang (and its extensions in the XPCC and People’s Government) is primarily on the decision-making and planning side during the mass detention campaign. The implementation, however, is carried out through the state organs – the People’s Government, and XPCC. For instance, de-extremification regulations were designed and implemented by the regional level Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Public Security Department, Justice Department, and Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission beginning in 2015 – and [Xinjiang De-extremification Regulations](#)[2] were enacted on 29 March 2017, only to be amended in October 2018 to create a legal ground for the mass detention. The releases of subsequent [White Papers](#) on the Uyghur region further justify the use of re-education centers to combat “extremism and terrorism” in the region. The “re-education” camps across the Uyghur region are managed by the [Vocational Skills Education and Training Service Administration](#) body at the local level. The task force is led by the [local party secretary](#), who coordinates the Public Security Bureau, Justice Bureau, Education Bureau, and Health Commission to [provide support](#) for the “re-education” camps. [Human Resources and Social Security Bureau](#) is primarily responsible for the [operation of the “re-education” camps](#) while assigning detainees to industrial parks, state-owned/XPCC-owned companies, and private enterprises as [forced labor](#) or providing official paperwork, such as a [“graduation certificate”](#) for the former detainees whereas local party schools [provide](#) political indoctrination services for the camps.

For example, the Human Resources Bureau of Turpan modified the training of about nine thousand surplus rural laborers in order to train five thousand workers who are expected to meet the [employment needs](#) of Xinjiang Hoshine Silicon Industry Co., Ltd, the largest producer of metallurgical-grade silicon in the world. Xinjiang Hoshine is directed and encouraged by the government to play a principal role in the repressive policies and is rewarded based on its performance. During the period of 2019-2021, the Turpan government recognized Xinjiang Hoshine as a [“key enterprise”](#) in its vocational skills implementation plan. In 2020, Hoshine’s parent company received an award as a

[“social helping and caring enterprise”](#) for its active participation in re-education and labor transfer programs. Xinjiang Hoshine is not a single case.

Chinese enterprises act as state apparatus and prioritize political, social, and cultural arrangements. The Local Party Secretaries of XPC or other administrative units collaborate with XPC enterprises, state-owned enterprises, and/or private enterprises to form grassroots organizations. These enterprises have taken on social responsibility commitments, wherein they participate in [labor transfer initiatives](#) organized by the Human Resources and Security Bureau under the names of “Xinjiang aid” or “poverty alleviation.” Another source of labor for these companies is individuals who have been “re-educated” according to the needs of the companies, as shown in the Hoshine case.

Complicity of High-Level Officials

High-level regional party members who also hold important positions in Beijing played significant roles in the decision-making and implementation processes of the mass detention campaign through “re-education.” For instance, Chen Quanguo, the Party Secretary of the CPC Xinjiang between August 2016, and December 2021 and currently deputy head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group, is one of the leading officials who institutionalized repressive policies in the region. He is believed to be one of the architects of the system of “re-education” camps for the [“ultimate goal of building a united, prosperous, and culturally advanced Xinjiang based on Chinese Characteristics.”](#) Chen, along with other members of the CPC Standing Committee during his tenure, were [sanctioned](#) by the United States under the Global Magnitsky Act for their involvement in the genocidal policies in the Uyghur region. Chronologically, Huo Liujun, Wang Mingshan, Zhu Hailun, and Chen Quanguo were sanctioned on July 9, 2020; Sun Jinlong and Peng Jiarui were sanctioned on July 31, 2020; Chen Mingguo and Wang Junzheng were sanctioned on March 22, 2021; Erkin Tuniyaz and Shohret Zakir were sanctioned on October 12, 2021.[3] Nevertheless, despite holding high-level positions during the period of mass detention, [Erkinjan Turaxun](#), [Xu Hairong](#), [Li Wei](#), Li Xuejun, Li Pengxin, Yang Xin, Ji Zheng, [Luo Dongchuan](#), [Shewket Imin](#), Ma Xuejun are not among the sanctioned individuals. The heads of other regional top agencies, such as the Justice Department and the Ethnic (and Religious) Affairs Commission, are not included in the list of sanctioned individuals. The new Party Secretary, Ma Xingrui, who took office after Chen Quanguo, and the majority of CPC Standing members in his tenure are not among the sanctioned officials, despite their continued implementation of genocidal policies in the region, promoting counter-terrorism campaigns, whitewashing, and continuing the genocidal policies being implemented since Chen’s office.

Endnote:

[1] The Anti-terrorism and Stability Maintenance Headquarters coordinates and leads counter-terrorism efforts, maintains social stability, oversees law enforcement activities, and establishes mechanisms for emergency response and accountability in XUAR.

[2] [新疆去极端化条例](#), also known as the XUAR De-extremization Regulation, outlines measures to prevent and eliminate extremism in the region. It defines extremism as the promotion of radical religious ideologies and behaviors that disrupt normal production and life. The regulation assigns responsibilities to various government departments, organizations, and individuals to implement de-extremization efforts, including education, training, and crackdown on extremist activities. It also specifies penalties for non-compliance with the regulation, [online](#).

[3] Wang Junzheng, former Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of XUAR, Current Secretary of the Party Committee of the TAR, [online](#); Zhu Hailun, former Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of XUAR, [online](#); Wang Mingshan, Member of the Standing Committee of the XUAR, Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee, and President of the Autonomous Region Law Society, [online](#); Chen Quanguo former

Secretary of the Party Committee of XUAR, current deputy head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group, [online](#); Sun Jinlong, former Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of XUAR, Political Commissar of XPCC, Chairman of China New Group Corporation, current Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Vice Minister of Ecology and Environment, [online](#); Peng Jiarui, former Vice Chairman of XUAR Government, current position unknown, [online](#); Chen Mingguo, Vice Chairman of the People's Government of XUAR, Director of the Public Security Department of the XUAR, [online](#); Shohret Zakir, current Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress, former Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of XUAR, [online](#); Erkin Tuniyaz, current Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of XUAR, Chairman of the District Government, [online](#).