“Disneyland Xinjiang”: Curated Tourism, Borrowed Voices, and the Whitewashing of Genocide

By Ablet Turdi

For years, the Chinese government tightly restricted travel and independent access to the Uyghur Region while carrying out a well-documented genocide against Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples. Today, Beijing is inviting foreign influencers, media, politicians, and everyday tourists to visit a curated “Disneyland-like Xinjiang” and using their presence and content to launder a false narrative that projects normalcy and whitewashes nearly a decade of mass atrocities.

This shift marks a transition from concealment to managed exposure. Rather than denying access altogether, Chinese authorities now permit and actively welcome carefully controlled visits under conditions designed to shape what visitors see, hear, and share with the world. Through curated itineraries, Potemkin-style tours of reconstructed heritage and showcase sites, and tightly monitored interactions with locals, authorities construct a version of the Uyghur Region designed for the foreign gaze.

A core tactic Beijing employs in this effort is “borrowing mouth to speak” (借嘴说话), by which authorities instrumentalize foreign influencers, select foreign media outlets, and curated visitors, presenting them as independent, third-party validators of Beijing’s narrative. This approach relies on tightly controlled propaganda tours and tourism-facing stages to generate upbeat “normal life” content tailored for foreign audiences, while strictly restricting access to spaces, people, and information that could contradict the official script.

This narrative-laundering campaign is not benign public diplomacy or incidental byproducts of tourism promotion. It functions as a coordinated global messaging strategy designed to undermine accountability, shape international policy discourse on Uyghur rights, and reframe rigorously documented findings of genocide as politically motivated “Western propaganda.” The findings below draw on open-source research and documented cases to reveal how China’s shift to managed exposure functions as a coordinated system of narrative control.

Key Findings:

• Cultural tourism in the Uyghur Region functions as narrative infrastructure for state messaging. Chinese authorities use reconstructed “heritage” sites, staged performances, and showcase religious sites to manufacture a controlled cultural spectacle that actively whitewashes genocide.
• State-organized visits operate as tightly choreographed public relations campaigns. Authorities script itineraries, control access points, and monitor interactions with local residents, leaving limited opportunity for unsupervised engagements or independent observation.
• Foreign visitors are willing or unwilling external validators of normalcy. Authorities selectively amplify their presence and  content to simulate independent confirmation of official narratives while journalists, researchers, and experts capable of meaningful scrutiny are restricted access.
• Access to the Uyghur Region follows a dual-track system. Authorities subject Uyghurs to coercive travel restrictions and pervasive surveillance, while selectively encouraging foreign tourism to advance state rebranding efforts that normalize repression and whitewash atrocities.

Unpacking Propaganda Tours

Chinese authorities organize propaganda tours to the Uyghur Region through the Cyberspace Administration of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and China Media Group (CMG). The region’s Cyberspace Administration operates under the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), a party-state organ directly subordinate to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The CAC also cooperates closely with the United Front through the “Network United Front” (网络统战), an initiative explicitly framed as “moving United Front work into the online sphere” (把“统战工作”放到线上来做).

Authorities tightly control these state-organized visits. They pre-script itineraries, pre- select sites, and closely monitor interactions, leaving little opportunity for unsupervised engagement. Officials steer visitors toward a pre-approved storyline emphasizing cultural tourism, stability, and “anti-terrorism/anti-extremism, “messaging, reinforced by photogenic scenes designed to circulate easily on social media.

Reporting from multiple outlets has documented the coercive and performative nature of these tours. In December 2025, Dutch media, covering a government-invited visit, reported constant surveillance, police intimidation, and tightly curated stops at state-approved venues, including a counter-terrorism museum. In November 2025, Turkish media outlet CNN Turk reported that state-backed cameramen recorded their every movement and conversations with locals during their official visit, underscoring the extent of  monitoring embedded in such tours.

Similarly, ABC’s reporting on a 2023 official tour detailed a series of  “model” stops, including select schools and kindergartens, factories, and picturesque towns, designed to confine visitors within a state-approved narrative. Authorities denied requests to visit internment camps, while directing visitors to night markets to project an image of “normalization.” Al Jazeera’s 2024 reporting described guided visits framed around history and stability, including showcase sites such as Kashgar’s Id Kah Mosque. While some participants echoed official claims of normalcy in the region, others emphasized that restricted access, controlled interactions, and deliberate omissions themselves signaled systematic coercion on concealment.

Two-Track Access: Restricting Uyghurs, Encouraging Foreign Tourism

Since the “Strike Hard” campaign in 2016, travel controls and pervasive surveillance have made mobility a conditional privilege for Uyghurs in the region. Authorities have arbitrarily confiscated passports across the region under the pretense of “safekeeping,” and punished people for simply contacting their family members abroad. In recent years, as part of government’s propaganda efforts, the Chinese government has allowed some Uyghurs to travel to or from the region, but only under strict conditions.

One common restriction is the “one person per family” rule, which allows only one family member to go abroad while the rest effectively remain as hostages. Officials sometimes require guarantors whom they punish if the traveler fails to come back on time. Uyghur travelers also report mandatory check-ins, including requirements to report daily activities to an assigned government official. And upon their return, authorities interrogated them and re-confiscated their passports.

For Uyghurs living abroad, visiting the region presents its own difficulties: stringent vetting to visit the region, while contact is increasingly steered into tightly monitored United Front-linked tours that are supervised and propaganda-driven. In January 2026, Chinese state-affiliated media reported more than four dozens Uyghurs from Turkey visiting their homeland after years of separation, with a United Front tour jointly organized with the Chinese mission in Turkey. It raises serious concerns about how and why those people needed such a big ceremony and government backed initiative to visit their family. At the same time, it contradicts with the state propaganda about normalcy in the region.

In contrast, the Chinese government has sought to whitewash its image by easing entry and promoting inbound tourism to Xinjiang, including through expanded visa-free access for many nationalities, while tightly controlling what foreign visitors can see and what global audiences hear. A central part of this reputational strategy is facilitating visits by foreign travel influencers to produce upbeat, “normal-life in Xinjiang” content, then amplifying these videos on various social media platforms (including YouTube and Instagram which are blocked in China) and featuring creators in state-media narratives that present foreigners as credible validators of Beijing’s official storyline.

Fake Heritage, Showcase Factories, and Orchestrated Worship

Chinese authorities have systematically demolished Uyghur historical heritage and replaced it with tourism-oriented “Amusement City Centers” designed for external consumption. These reconstructed spaces function not preservation efforts but as curated stages that simulate cultural continuity while obscuring ongoing repression.

Kashgar offers the clearest example. Authorities began demolishing and reconstructing Kashgar’s Old City as early as 2008. The Uyghur Human Rights Project estimates that officials destroyed approximately 85 percent of the original quarter and forcibly relocated residents. The renovated sections now operate as a curated, “Disneyland-like” visitor zone, with rebuilt façades, photogenic gateways, and sanitized streetscapes that present a commodified version of Uyghur heritage infused with state-sanctioned Han cultural aesthetics. State-linked promotional material highlight choreographed cultural welcomes, including staged dances for tourists, sometimes featuring performers in Han-style costumes that do not reflect Uyghur traditions.

Chinese authorities also showcase factories and production sites to select influencers while denying independent access. State media have used foreign influencers to counter allegations of forced labor through guided tours of cotton production sites. For example, in 2021, CGTN aired a segment following foreign blogger Raz Galor during a visit to a cotton farm in the Aksu City, highlighting mechanized production and interviewing local farmers about income levels. Filmed and edited by a CGTN crew, the segment exemplifies managed access presented as spontaneous verification, particularly notable given the restrictions faced by independent journalists and experts.

Deutsche Welle has similarly documented the “expat YouTuber” format, in which foreign creators tour the Uyghur Region and interview workers who deny forced labor as part of a media strategy designed to rebut international criticism. At the same time, Chinese authorities continue to deny unfettered access to factories by independent auditors and due diligence firms, making meaningful assessment of  state-imposed forced labor risks impossible.

Authorities have applied similar tactics to religious sites. Across the Uyghur Region, officials have demolished or altered mosques while leaving a limited number open primarily for propaganda purposes. A 2021 report by the  Australian Strategic Policy Institute, based on satellite imagery, estimated that Chinese authorities had damaged or destroyed approximately 16,000 mosques, approximately 65 percent of total mosques in the region. A Reuters investigation that same year reported that journalists visiting more than two dozen mosques over a two-week trip found most partially or completely demolished. In some cases, domes and minarets had been removed and replaced with “Chinese-style” architectural features.

Some remaining mosques now function primarily museum-like tourist sites rather than places of worship. In 2023, Radio Free Asia reported, citing official sources, that Kashgar’s Id Kah Mosque was open to tourists through ticketed entry while Uyghur faced restriction on prayer. In September 2025, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zardari visited Id Kah Mosque and shared photographs of his delegation praying there. No Uyghur worshippers appeared in the images, underscoring the highly choregraphed nature of the visit and ongoing restrictions on everyday religious practice.  

Accounts from Muslim visitors further reinforce this pattern. Several reported encountering mosques that were visibly intact but effectively closed for prayer. Turkish journalist Taha Kılınç, who visited the region in 2025 and later published a  book about his experience, similarly described how authorities maintain select mosques for propaganda purposes. He reported witnessing officials forcing elderly Uyghur men to swear loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party at a mosque prior to prayer, illustrating how religious spaces themselves have been transformed into sites of political control.

Policy Implications

Beijing’s “War on Narratives” does not merely respond to Western criticism; it seeks to redefine reality for international audiences. Chinese authorities mobilize foreign influencers and curated visitors to launder state narratives through seemingly independent voices. This practice distorts the information environment for policymakers and the international public, weakening sanctions enforcement, corporate due diligence, and multilateral pressure.

This propaganda strategy operates in close coordination with the Chinese Communist Party’s United Fron Work Department (UFWD). The UFWD’s mandate explicitly includes monitoring Uyghur diaspora communities, compiling databases of actionable intelligence, and mobilizing overseas organizations to counter international criticism of China’s policies. Following its 2018 reorganization, the UFWD dedicated three of its twelve bureaus and two vice ministers to overseas work, reflecting the CCP’s expanding ambitions to influence diaspora communities worldwide. The result is a systemic effort to control not only what is said about the Uyghur Region, but who is permitted to speak credibly about it.

These efforts carry serious implications for the Uyghur diaspora. United Front-linked organizations that claim to represent “Xinjiang” and its peoples play an important role in muting independent voices while amplifying CCP messaging and disinformation. Propaganda tours that involve members of the Uyghurs diaspora create reputational and community harms by reshaping public perceptions of what constitutes “credible testimony.” When state-orchestrated voices are presented as authentic, survivor testimony becomes easier to dismiss as politicized or unreliable.

The erosion of epistemic trust is a strategic objective. If international audiences can no longer distinguish between genuine witness accounts and manufactured narratives, the evidentiary foundation for international accountability is fundamentally undermined.

Governments and policymakers should therefore treat curated visits and testimonial content as presumptively state-orchestrated and press for independent access and evidence standards that reflect the coercive environment in the Uyghur Region. Governments should also demand accountability for the Chinese government’s genocide and crimes against humanity in the region and call for a follow up assessment by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, building on its landmark 2022 report. Companies and auditors should avoid “narrative rebuttals” as substitutes for supply-chain verification and presume that goods produced in whole or in part made in the Uyghur Region carry a high risk of state-imposed forced labor.